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The Legacy of Brexit in the Courts: Ship-Money, 
Formalism, and the Value of Choice? 
 
Samuel Ley* 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This note critically examines the UK Supreme Court’s judgment in R (Miller) v Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union. The majority decision upheld the finding of the 
Divisional Court that the Government’s foreign affairs prerogative did not provide a legal basis 
for giving notice under Article 50 TEU to EU institutions of the UK’s intention to withdraw 
from the EU. The Divisional Court was held out by many as ‘the enemies of the people’ for 
seeking to frustrate the will of the people as expressed in the National Referendum of 23 June 
2016. The majority in the Supreme Court has similarly been heavily criticised by academics and 
the minority for pursuing an ‘exercise in pure legal formalism’. By drawing on case law from 
1637 and pioneering theoretical work on the fair attribution of responsibility, this note provides 
a comprehensive defence of the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller to finally displace the critique 
of legal formalism. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On 23 June 2016, a UK-wide referendum was held under the European Union 
Referendum Act 2015. It produced an overall majority in favour of leaving the 
EU. With this vote, a process of vast social, legal, economic, and political change 
was initiated. Against this background, the Government sought to notify the EU 
institutions of its intention to withdraw the UK from the Union. Article 50 of the 
Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’), provides that ‘Any member state may decide 
to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements.’ It was the meaning of those ‘constitutional requirements’, and 
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whether the Government could lawfully trigger Article 50 without the consent of 
Parliament, as it so claimed, which concerned the Supreme Court (‘UKSC’) in 
Miller.1 The Court handed its decision down on 24 January 2017. Enough time 
has now passed, and enough dust has settled, to take stock of the decision’s merits. 
This article seeks to make a belated, yet unique, contribution to what has 
turned into a rather sour public debate on the merits of the Miller decision. It 
argues that, contrary to many voices suggesting otherwise, the judgment was not 
excessively ‘formalistic’ and the critique of ‘formalism’ falls short in all its different 
guises. In Miller, the UKSC emphasised its role as an autonomous constitutional 
player. Left to pick up the pieces of a fractured political relationship, the UKSC 
sought to compensate for perceived or actual weaknesses of the executive and the 
legislature, thereby promoting circumstances best conducive to the exercise of 
their rational constitutional agency. To these ends, the reasoning of the majority 
in the UKSC will be defended. 
In making these submissions, this article will first set out the decision in 
Miller before directing the reader’s gaze back in time to a case decided by the Court 
of Exchequer in 1637.2 In doing so, this article will draw on certain strands of 
theoretical reasoning: one well-trodden in the public law discourse, the other 
hitherto under-explored.3 Under such guidance, one is able to better understand 
the constitutional implications of Miller and how the latter ought to govern future 
legal changes. 
 
I. MILLER 
 
In the Divisional Court4 the debate was framed as a matter of two questions: first, 
could the Government trigger Article 50 in the exercise of its foreign affairs 
prerogative and second, was there any statutory basis for the executive to trigger 
Article 50 TEU? In answering the first question, the Divisional Court held that 
                                                             
1 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] 2 WLR 
583 (SC). 
2 R v John Hampden (The Case of Ship-Money) (1637) 3 Howell State Trials 825. 
3 On the latter, see eg Emmanuel Voyiakis, Private Law and the Value of Choice (Hart 
Publishing 2017). 
4 R (Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 
(Admin) in the Divisional Court before Lord Thomas CJ, Sir Terence Etherton MR, and 
Sales LJ. 
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whilst the making and unmaking of international treaties is normally a matter for 
the Crown, ‘the Crown cannot, in ordinary circumstances, alter domestic law (…) 
it cannot [without Parliament], confer rights on individuals or deprive individuals 
of rights.’5 For the Divisional Court, the ‘powerful constitutional principle’ that 
the Crown has no power to alter the law of the land should take precedence over 
its treaty-making power as it was ‘the product of an especially strong constitutional 
tradition in the UK.’6  
In relation to the second question, relying on the status of the European 
Communities Act 1972 (‘ECA’) as a ‘constitutional statute’ which could not be 
impliedly repealed by the enactment of later inconsistent legislation,7 the Court 
reasoned that since Parliament had designated the ECA 1972 to be ‘a statute of 
major constitutional importance’ and had thereby indicated that it should be 
exempt from implied repeal by Parliament itself, it could not have intended that 
the Crown remove those rights through the use of its prerogative powers.8 The 
Court also further bolstered its interpretation of Parliamentary intention by 
reference to a textual analysis of the relevant statutory provisions.9 
In the Supreme Court, this reasoning was largely affirmed by an 8-3 
majority decision.10 As earlier, the Court framed the debate as a tension between 
the two familiar constitutional principles. The first is that ‘ministers generally 
enjoy a power freely to enter into and to terminate treaties’. The second feature is 
that ministers are not normally entitled to exercise any power if it results in a 
change in UK domestic law, unless a statute, ie an Act of Parliament, so 
provides.11 
In terms of which power should take precedence, the Court decided for 
Parliament by refusing to add a new exception to the rule that the prerogative 
cannot change the law, beyond the two very limited categories already 
                                                             
5 ibid [32]. 
6 ibid [86]. 
7 cf Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151 [60]–[64]. 
8 R (Miller and Dos Santos) (n 4) [88]. 
9 ibid [93]-[94]. 
10 Miller (n 1) [101] and [115] (Lord Neuberger, Baroness Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, 
Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Hodge). 
11 Miller (n 1) [5]. 
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recognised.12 To come to this conclusion, the Supreme Court reached further than 
the Divisional Court. In what has been called ‘a significant restatement of basic 
elements of UK constitutional law’,13 the majority held that the ECA 1972 did not 
simply give effect to the EU Treaties, but instead introduced into UK law ‘an entirely 
new, independent and overriding source of domestic law’.14 The Court considered 
that whilst ‘in one sense (…) it can be said that the 1972 Act is the source of EU 
law (…) in a more fundamental sense and, we consider, a more realistic sense, where 
EU law applies in the United Kingdom, it is the EU institutions which are the 
relevant source of that law’.15 The conclusion inevitably followed that the 
prerogative could not be used to repeal EU law, just like it could not be used to 
repeal any other Act of Parliament. This, the Court held, amounted to a 
‘fundamental legal change’16 which must be effected in ‘the only way that the UK 
constitution recognises, namely by Parliamentary legislation.’17 
On the issue of whether statute had changed this, the UKSC upheld the 
Divisional Court’s finding that the Government could not remove constitutional 
statutory rights18 by invoking the principle of legality in ex parte Simms19 to interpret 
the ECA 1972 as a constitutional statute.  
In the minority, Lord Reed took the view that the ECA ‘imposes no 
requirement and manifests no intention, in respect of the UK’s membership of 
the EU’.20 Rather, it is only a ‘scheme under which the effect given to EU law in 
domestic law reflects the UK’s international obligations under the Treaties, 
whatever they may be.’21 In line with the characterisation of EU law supported by 
                                                             
12 Namely, where it is inherent in the prerogative power that its exercise will affect the legal 
rights and duties of others and where the effect of an exercise of prerogative powers is 
to change the facts to which the law applies. 
13 Thomas Poole, ‘Devotion to Legalism: On the Brexit Case’ (2017) 80 MLR 685, 697, 
699. 
14 Miller (n 1) [80] (Lord Neuberger, Baroness Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke, 
Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption, Lord Hodge). 
15 ibid [61]. 
16 ibid [83]. 
17 ibid [82]. 
18 ibid [83]. 
19 ibid [83], [108]. 
20 ibid [177] Lord Reed. 
21 ibid [187] (emphasis added). 
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critics Feldman22 and Elliott,23 the 1972 Act could therefore be seen as a channel 
running between two legal systems, allowing EU law and rights to be drawn on in 
Member States’ systems, subject to various constitutional fillers which may differ 
between Member States.24 In short, this represents a strictly dualist position where 
the Government’s prerogative power to make and unmake international treaties 
remained intact.  
Furthermore, the minority advanced a normative justification for their 
conclusions. Lord Hughes and Lord Carnwathboth emphasised, to differing 
degrees, the essentially political nature of the case which dictated minimal judicial 
intervention25 and the case’s false binary nature being presented as a choice 
between Parliamentary sovereignty and the ‘untrammelled’ exercise of the 
prerogative by the Executive. For the minority, ‘no less fundamental to our 
constitution is the principle of Parliamentary accountability. The Executive is 
accountable to Parliament for its exercise of the prerogative, including its actions 
in international law’.26 
 
II. HAMPDEN’S CASE 
 
Rewinding the clock to the 1600s, a case decided during the radically different 
constitutional scene preceding the Glorious Revolution provides an unexpected 
guide to understanding the Miller judgment. Ship-money was a tax in England 
levied intermittently during the seventeenth century, typically on the inhabitants 
of coastal areas for reasons of national defence or purposes such as transport. 
Counties were required to provide ships or, money in lieu of ships as means to 
those ends. Following the Petition of Right in 1628, ship-money was one of rare 
taxes that the Crown could levy by its own prerogative powers without 
Parliamentary approval. From 1634 onwards, King Charles I sought to levy ship-
money during peacetime on the inland counties of England. John Hampden, a 
                                                             
22 David Feldman, ‘Pulling a Trigger or Starting a Journey? Brexit in the Supreme Court’ 
(2017) 76 CLJ 217. 
23 Mark Elliott, ‘The Supreme Court’s judgment in Miller: In Search of Constitutional 
Principle’ (2017) 76 CLJ 257. 
24 Jeffrey Jowell, Dawn Oliver and Colm O’Cinneide (eds), The Changing Constitution (8th 
edn, OUP 2015) ch 5. 
25 Miller (n 1) [273] (Lord Carnwath), [240] (Lord Reed). 
26 ibid [249] (Lord Carnwath). 
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wealthy Buckinghamshire landowner, refused payment of a ship-money writ 
issued in August 1635 on the basis of its interference with his property rights. A 
fully constituted panel of twelve judges in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, as it 
then was, found against Hampden by a 7-5 majority.27 
Before delving into the reasons for the majority’s decision, it is of interest 
to note certain superficial similarities between Hampden and Miller. In Miller, the 
UKSC rightly, in the view of this author, stressed the ‘unique’ nature of the case.28 
The uniqueness of the decision is demonstrated in three ways, all three of which 
coincide with certain features of the Hampden case. 
First, both cases concerned a conflict of the Crown’s power and 
interference with individual rights, occurring in circumstances of uncertain and 
sweeping constitutional change. The cases had ostensibly limited impact and 
resulted in heavy criticism against the judiciary. In 1637, as noted above, the 
English constitutional set-up was in transition. By August 1641, the so-called 
Long Parliament of England had declared, both by resolution and the Ship Money 
Act 1640, that the levy of ship-money, the opinions of the judges in Hampden 
approving its legality, and the judgment against Mr Hampden were illegal. This 
retrospective enactment implied that the large majority of the judges had taken an 
erroneous view in Hampden – one that most historians of the seventeenth century 
have stringently criticised them for.29 Indeed, such was the condemnation of the 
Hampden decision that seven judges were impeached or threatened with 
impeachment either on account of their judgments or for their shares in the extra-
judicial opinions preceding the case.30  
Similarly, in addition to taking place at a time of great constitutional change 
and setting up a collision of Crown power and individual rights, Miller was unique 
in its own contradiction: it garnered intense public interest and elicited from 
sections of the population a shameful reaction to the Divisional Court judgment. 
Yet, prima facie, its political impact was also ‘distinctly muted’.31 By the time the 
case came before the UKSC, the Court was well aware that both the Government 
                                                             
27 Hampden (n 2). 
28 Miller (n 1) [90]. 
29 David L Keir, ‘The Case of Ship-money’ (1936) 52 LQR 546. 
30 ibid 557. 
31 Richard Clayton, ‘The Brexit Case That Never Was’ (UK Con Law Blog, 22 March 2017) 
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/03/22/richard-clayton-qc-the-brexit-case-
that-never-was/> accessed 27 January 2018. 
 
2018 LSE LAW REVIEW 91 
 
 
and Parliament had agreed to implement the referendum result through whatever 
means their respective constitutional positions allowed.32 Moreover, perhaps to 
the dismay of many, the Miller decision did not ‘stop Brexit’. Miller was, it seemed, 
‘the Brexit case that never was’.33 In both cases, therefore, the Court took what in 
hindsight became an unpopular position concerning when Parliamentary consent 
ought to be obtained in the exercise of the prerogative. Their decision was later 
addressed by Parliament, with the judiciary branded enemies of the people.34 
Second, in both Hampden and Miller, the decisions were reached on 
relatively narrow points of law divorced from the factual complexities and 
matrices of their time. The writ demanding ship-money in Hampden famously 
asserted that the realm was exposed to the danger of ravaging pirates and 
threatened by disorders in neighbouring countries.35 This assertion seemed to be 
generally accepted with little protest on either side so that, by the time the case 
reached the Court of Exchequer, only a point of law could be decided and no real 
dispute arose on whether any national emergency did in fact exist.36 
Similarly, from the outset in the Miller case, the Government had faced an 
uphill challenge due to its own poor characterisation of the case.37 Through the 
Government’s acceptance that notification given under Article 50 TEU was 
‘irrevocable’, the claimants were able to liken an Article 50 notification to ‘firing 
a bullet’,38 which would inevitably lead to the UK ceasing to be a Member State 
of the EU.39 Thus, there was an automatic ‘danger’ to the existence of UK 
domestic law because EU law was part of domestic law and would cease to have 
effect. Whilst acceptance thereof on behalf of the Government perhaps reflected 
a deeper political need to avoid appearing to resist Brexit,40 to the Supreme Court 
                                                             
32 Miller (n 1) [32]-[33]. 
33 Clayton (n 31). 
34 Though after Miller, of course, Parliament did not partake in this judicial defenestration. 
35 Hampden (n 2) 1006 (Sir Francis Weston). 
36 ibid, although it is questionable whether the Court could actually have decided such a 
question, even if it had addressed it. 
37 In conversation with Professor Thomas Poole, LSE. 
38 Miller (n 1) [36]. 
39 Endorsed by the majority in Miller (n 1) [94]. 
40 Feldman (n 22) 219. 
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it may have seemed somewhat unsatisfactory that the outcome of the case should 
turn on such a technicality.41  
The final ‘unique’ feature of both cases is more subtle, yet still noteworthy. 
In the UKSC, the majority describe the EU Treaties as ‘unique in their legislative 
and constitutional implications [because] a dynamic, international source of law 
was grafted onto, and above, the well-established existing sources of domestic 
law’.42 Commentators have picked up on the distinct constitutional shifts of this 
claim as it represents a judicial choice that in certain ways ‘redescribes’ the 
‘Parliamentary sovereignty paradigm’.43  
How was the UKSC able to perpetuate this change? In large part, the 
Justices were unconstrained by authority. Whilst counsel had taken the Court on 
an interesting journey through four centuries of legal sources from different parts 
of the common law world, direct precedents remained ‘hard to find’.44 
Furthermore, Hampden was ‘something of a novelty’ to the Court of Exchequer. 
Though ship-money had frequently been levied on seaports and coastal places, 
and even on inland towns, it generally had not been required from inland 
counties.45 Throughout the judgement, therefore, few authorities are cited on the 
direct point that the King ought not to impose ship-money beyond the coastal 
regions.  
This last point serves only to indicate that the uniqueness of the Miller and 
Hampden cases lay not only in their political ‘circumstantial location’ per se, but 
can likewise be found in their judicial treatment. These conditions formed part of 
the background against which Miller should be evaluated. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
41 Indeed Lord Kerr expressed his views on the matter, ‘Brexit Is Reversible Even after 
Date Is Set, Says Author of Article 50’ The Guardian (London, 10 November 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/nov/10/brexit-date-is-not-irreversible-
says-man-who-wrote-article-50-lord-kerr> accessed 27 January 2018. 
42 Miller (n 1) [90]. 
43 Poole (n 13) 704. 
44 Miller (n 1) [246]-[247] (Lord Carnwath) and [54] (the majority): ‘There is little case law 
on the power to terminate or withdraw from treaties’. 
45 Keir (n 29) 555. 
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III. LESSONS LEARNED 
 
Of course, as noted earlier, the constitutional scene prior to 1688 was very 
different from its contemporary counterpart. It therefore seems unlikely that, 
despite superficial similarities, Hampden can be directly applied to the Miller 
judgment. However, lessons may still be learned from the arguments made by the 
majority and minority opinions in the case. The manner in which the case was 
argued set up a collision between the property rights of the people, on the one 
side, and the Crown’s prerogative power, on the other: could the King interfere 
with such rights by levying the ship-money tax on the people without 
Parliamentary consent? There are two, sometimes overlapping, lines of reasoning 
to be discerned from the majority’s decision, which sought to answer the 
aforementioned question. The first focuses on the duties the sovereign owes vis-
à-vis its people – the duty argument. The second centres on the political 
circumstances at the time of the decision – the political argument. 
The duty argument runs as follows. The Hampden majority agreed that the 
law provided the King with means, through prerogative powers, tenure, or 
tonnage and poundage, to keep the seas open and guard the coasts.46 Where the 
King’s resources were inadequate for ordinary needs, he ought to borrow those 
funds needed or obtain consent from Parliament, refraining from the levying of 
ship-money. However, the King is the sole judge to decide when an emergency 
situation exists and what means are required for defence – a duty to make 
adequate preparations for which the ‘common consent in Parliament’ was not 
required.47 The latter was grounded in the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia: where 
a duty is imposed on the King to defend the kingdom, he must be conferred the 
necessary powers to fulfil that duty,48 including the ability to take all those 
measures necessary to secure defence of the realm.49  
Whilst differing amongst themselves, for current purposes it suffices to 
note that in contrast to the majority, the minority clung to a distinction between 
‘immediate’ and ‘apprehended’ emergencies. Under the latter definition, the King 
                                                             
46 Hampden (n 2) 1081 (Crawley), 1200 (Hutton). 
47 ibid 1097. 
48 ibid 1187 (Jones): ‘[the King] cannot be a king, unless he take the defence and protection 
of his people upon him’. 
49 ibid 1226 (Finch), cf 1210 (Davenport). 
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cannot take any such steps that involved encroachment upon the subject’s 
property and must instead summon Parliament for their approval.50 This author 
supports Kier’s contention that the minority’s position put forward two 
arguments which were, ultimately, ‘mutually destructive’.51 They asserted at once 
that the King must provide for national defence, but that he was not free to do so 
if it involved any interference with property.52 Instead the majority’s position is 
preferred: if an emergency existed, it should make no difference whether it were 
near or remote: ‘will you suffer an enemy to come in before you prepare to 
resist?’.53 Ultimately, the position adopted by the majority may be rationalised as 
a response to the question of whether, assuming the realm to be in danger, the 
King’s right and duty to provide against the danger should be brought to a 
standstill by the subject’s right to his property, which must subsist until the ‘very 
moment the storm has burst on the realm’ and its safety has been ‘irreparably 
destroyed’.54 It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the majority were correct 
in finding against John Hampden. 
The political argument is less developed and in some ways feeds off of the 
duty argument. Whilst the duty argument focuses narrowly on the need for the 
sovereign to enforce its duty to the people, the political argument widens the lens 
slightly to accommodate the wider political circumstances of the time. Though 
based on the same premises, the latter concludes in a slightly different manner. 
Having framed the question as a matter of tension between the sovereign’s duty 
and the people’s rights, and having taken into account the constitutional 
circumstance of the time, the Court of Exchequer noted that the last Parliament 
‘stirred up nothing but confusion and discontentment, as we now feel it to our 
great prejudice’.55 For Weston, while the consent of Parliament may have been 
the ideal, sometimes Parliament ‘may be so dilatory, that the kingdom may be lost 
in the meantime’.56 Thus, Keir concludes, the majority were ‘not easily persuaded 
                                                             
50 ibid 1134 (Crooke): ‘(…) for a general charge of money upon the people, it cannot be 
upon any pretence of danger or necessity’. 
51 Keir (n 29) 550. 
52 ibid. 
53 Hampden (n 2) 1189 (Jones), 1234 (Finch). 
54 Keir (n 29) 557. 
55 Hampden (n 2) 1196 (Hutton). 
56 ibid 1075 (Weston): ‘Will you have forces on both sides, and restrain the king to his 
power by parliament, which may be so dilatory, that the kingdom may be lost in the 
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that Parliaments would always be speedy, wise or generous; and few who have 
read the history of Charles’ first four years as King will think this view 
unreasonable’.57 In 1625, for example, Parliament sat for only three months 
before being dissolved and dubbed the ‘Useless Parliament’ by the King having 
passed no meaningful legislation. The crux of the political argument is found in 
the Court’s conclusion, drawn from the political circumstances of the times and 
exemplified in a distinct message: for the majority in Hampden ‘it was safer to say 
“trust the king” than “trust the Parliament”’.58  
If, despite superficial similarities, these arguments made in Hampden 
cannot be of direct application to the Miller judgment, what can we nevertheless 
learn from it? There are two lessons. First, when seeking to attribute responsibility 
between the Crown and Parliament, we can learn from the duty argument that in 
order to act fairly between the bodies, the Court must give those under a relevant 
duty the effective opportunity to effectuate that duty; in other words, an 
opportunity to choose which they have reason to value.59 Thus, the attribution of 
responsibility takes place on terms we the people could not reasonably reject. 
Second, in support of this first contention, the political argument can teach us that 
any such analysis must seek to compensate for the relative institutional 
competencies of the constitutional actors.60 Taken together, these lines of 
reasoning provide us with sufficient tools to defend the Miller judgment.  
 
IV. CRITICISING MILLER 
 
With this in mind, we can fast-forward from Hampden (several hundred years, a 
constitutional revolution and a few national referendums later), to the Supreme 
Court judgment in Miller. In both the Divisional Court and Supreme Court, the 
                                                             
mean time?’. Weston asks the rhetorical question: ‘Is it not better to endure a mischief, 
than an inconvenience’. 
57 Keir (n 29) 557. 
58 ibid. 
59 This defence of Miller ultimately rests in large part on a unique account of when it is fair 
to delegate responsibility between actors of value. See Voyiakis (n 3) for a well-written 
reorientation of the private law of torts using such an account. 
60 As is well-established by what some have called the tradition of institutional pragmatism 
whereby the Court seeks ‘to compensate for perceived or actual weaknesses of [other] 
constitutional players’. See CJS Knight, ‘Bi-Polar Sovereignty Restated’ (2009) 68 CLJ 
361. 
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reasoning appears to be a strong and simple affirmation of Parliamentary 
sovereignty. In contrast to the prerogative power to make and unmake 
international treaties, the ‘superior norm’ was that Parliamentary consent is 
required to change domestic law. However, those criticising the UKSC appear to 
be seeking reasons as to why this ought to be so. The Court was asked to choose 
between two principles regulating the prerogative power. Stating that one takes 
precedence over the other simply by virtue of superiority seems inadequate. What 
is required is a normative argument for the majority’s conclusions.  
The UKSC judgment does put forward suggestions. But, as will be 
explored below, for some, the Court’s dual assertion that: (1) it was more realistic 
to view EU law as domestic law; and (2) that withdrawal from the EU was of 
‘fundamental constitutional’ implication, were deficient. Such argumentative 
deficiency would seem to indicate that: (a) the majority’s ruling was one which 
made no practical difference;61 and (b) that the UKSC’s reasons for reaching its 
conclusions were insufficiently explained, which thereby indicated that it had 
other reasons for its findings.62 Throughout this article, these arguments are 
referred to as the ‘critique of formalism’ or the ‘formalism critique’. What the 
minority called ‘an exercise in pure legal formalism’63 foreshadows much of the 
criticism and a more wide-ranging debate concerning legal realism and judicial 
reasoning. At its core, the critique of formalism exhibits three key elements: (1) 
the UKSC was unjustifiably divorced from practical reality; (2) it insufficiently 
explained its reasoning; and further, or in the alternative, the (3) UKSC was in any 
case simply not justified in reaching the conclusions it did. 
The need to defend the UKSC is perhaps not paramount, but should 
similarly not be understated. After all, as mentioned already, before the hearing of 
the appeal in the Supreme Court, large sections of the British press came with a 
well-documented reply to the Divisional Court decision: the judges were ‘enemies 
of the people’.64 As Barber and King cautiously remark, ‘the reaction to Miller 
                                                             
61 As expressly stated by in Miller (n 1) [273] (Lord Carnwath). 
62 The general, broad-brush critique of the legal realists, see further Joseph W Singer, ‘The 
Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory’ (1984) 94 Yale L J 1. 
63 Miller (n 1) [273] (Lord Carnwath). 
64 Claire Phipps, ‘British Newspapers React to Judges’ Brexit Ruling: ‘Enemies of the 
People’’ The Guardian (London, 4 November 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/04/enemies-of-the-people-
british-newspapers-react-judges-brexit-ruling> accessed 27 January 2018. 
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presents a grave threat to our constitutional order, a threat both to the rule of law 
and to the very structure of democracy in the United Kingdom’ – in short it 
undermines the legitimacy of judicial decision-making.65 This cause for concern is 
only strengthened when academic commentators such as Feldman66 and Elliott,67 
forthcoming with strong criticism of the Miller judgment, level stringent criticism 
at the UKSC.  
Whilst keeping the scope of this essay focused narrowly on the tension 
between prerogative powers and Parliamentary consent, this contribution hopes 
to find the main criticisms of the reasoning of the UKSC in Miller wanting.68 It 
does so by setting out and subsequently defending each of the different key 
elements of the UKSC’s reasoning. Finally, this article shows that the decision is 
positively justified by reference to the lessons learned from Hampden. Far from 
reaching conclusions contrary to the ‘will of the people’, the UKSC sought to 
uphold the common good. Overall, then, the critique of formalism is misplaced 
as the UKSC was ultimately justified in reaching its final conclusion, both as a 
matter of practical reality and the common good of the people. The UKSC in 
Miller showed itself alive to such criticisms and correctly emphasised the flexibility 
of the British Constitution. 
 
‘Direct and Independent’ EU Law 
A crucial part of the UKSC’s reasoning hinged on the notion that with the ECA, 
EU law became a ‘direct and independent source of domestic law’.69 For the 
majority, whilst ‘in one sense’ UK law ‘is the source of EU law’ because without 
the ECA EU law would have no domestic status, in a more ‘realistic’ sense the 
majority concluded that ‘it is the institutions of the EU which are the relevant 
source of EU law’ so EU law is an ‘independent and over-riding source of 
                                                             
65 Nick Barber and Jeff King, ‘Responding to Miller’ (UK Con Law Blog, 07 November 2016) 
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/11/07/nick-barber-and-jeff-king-responding-
to-miller/> accessed 27 January 2018. 
66 Feldman (n 22). 
67 Elliot (n 23). 
68 I will thereby avoid the other argument under appeal concerning whether the consent of 
devolved legislatures was required to effect withdrawal discussed in Miller (n 1) [136]. I 
will also avoid straying too far into jurisprudential debates concerning legal realism and 
its allies by not discussing whether the UKSC was correct to hear the case, although I 
inevitably thought it was. See Barber and King (n 65). 
69 Miller (n 1) [65], [80]. 
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domestic law.’70 This led the majority to conclude that the prerogative cannot in 
the first place be used to alter EU law because that law is domestic law. The majority 
considered that this was consistent with Parliamentary sovereignty and therefore 
did not alter the rule of recognition in UK constitutional law.71 The literature on 
the topic has not fully acknowledged this finding to be crucial to the majority’s 
overall position. It was, however, recognised that traditional dualist theory dictates 
that international treaties are not normally considered part of domestic law until 
incorporated by statute.72 Subtly, the majority conceded to that the dualist system 
is a ‘necessary corollary of Parliamentary sovereignty [and that it] exists to protect 
Parliament not ministers.’73 It was only, therefore, by bending this tradition and 
making EU law a source of domestic law itself that the majority opinion could be 
sustained. 
Elliott strongly criticises this reasoning. The Court, Elliott notes, cannot 
maintain both that EU law is an independent source of domestic law and that the 
rule of recognition has not been altered because ‘a source of law can only be 
independent in the relevant sense if it is acknowledged as a source of law by the 
rule of recognition.’74 Thus the majority’s reasoning is unclear and contradictory, 
contending that EU law is both dependent upon the ECA for its domestic status 
and an independent source of domestic law. For Elliott, as well as Lord Reed in 
the minority, if the rule of recognition has not changed, EU law was not domestic 
law – it only took effect in domestic law by reason of the ECA and so is dependent 
on that statute. 
The criticisms can be taken in turn. The first issue pertains to the UKSC’s 
reasoning and engages the need for the UKSC to sufficiently explain its reasoning 
if it is to completely avoid the critique of formalism. Much must turn on what is 
meant by ‘realistic’ in the context of the majority’s reasoning. A close analysis of 
paragraph 61 suggests that the Court’s reasoning hinges on a Kelsonian 
distinction between juristic law and fact. Kelsen sought to raise to the level of 
consciousness what all jurists are doing when they understand positive law as a 
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72 JH Rayner [1990] 2 AC 418, 500 (Lord Oliver). 
73 Miller (n 1) [57]. 
74 Elliott (n 23) 272. 
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valid system.75 For Kelsen, when a jurist applies the law to the facts of a case, he 
or she imputes legal responsibility which, in turn, presupposes a valid formal ‘basic 
norm’ that validates all other norms but is itself independent of empirical fact. 
Thus, when a jurist applies EU law to the facts of a case by an act of juristic 
imputation, he or she presupposes not just that it is a direct independent source of 
law, but also one that derives its substantive authority from the fact of 
Parliamentary approval through the ECA. In a Kelsonian analysis, the two are 
quite distinct as law and fact.76  
As a matter of explaining their reasoning in reply to the critique of 
formalism, a close reading of paragraph 61 demonstrates that the Court reasoned 
by contrasting examples of law and fact, which reflected the Kelsonian distinction 
outlined above. Whilst it is true that the Government can influence the outcome 
of EU legislative processes, ie the factual substance of EU law, the creation or 
abrogation of ‘rules of law’ without the specific sanction of any UK institution 
take ‘automatic and overriding effect’, ie as a matter of juristic form or law, 
without any further act by Parliament.  
These arguments did not only coincide with the acts of jurists in ivory 
towers. The majority took Raz’s criticism of Kelsen’s theory, arguing that one 
must not ignore the ‘the attitude of the population and the courts’ in deciding ‘the 
identity and unity of a legal system’, to heart.77 Not only was this more realistic as 
a matter of Kelsonian juristic thinking, but adopting the ‘attitude of the 
population’ draws attention to the fact that the entire narrative of the leave 
campaign was based on the idea that the EU compromised British sovereignty. In 
Miller, the majority gave this message its best effect possible while also preserving 
the rule of recognition and in doing so exhibited a ‘degree of innovation and 
sophistication’.78 Here, then, the critique of formalism, if it asked questions of the 
UKSC’s ability to engage with political realities of 2016, also fails. 
The UKSC maintained that all of the aforementioned did not alter the rule 
of recognition.79 As Poole has convincingly demonstrated, by distinguishing 
                                                             
75 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (OUP 1992) 58. 
76 ibid. The former being defined as acts of will ‘directed at a definite human behaviour’. 
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between Parliament as a constituent agent and a legislator (creator of general 
norms), the rule of recognition remains unaltered. It is perfectly coherent to argue 
that EU law has primacy at the level of ordinary law (government), but that it 
itself did not alter the fundamentals of constitutional order (sovereignty).80 
According to the majority, therefore, it seemed more realistic to say that EU law 
is domestic law, instead of only taking effect in domestic law. 
Once EU legislation is portrayed in this manner, it follows that whilst the 
ECA could accommodate the varying content of EU law, for example through 
the enactment of EU legislation, it could not accommodate withdrawal. The 
UKSC reasoned that even though the content of EU law could vary, ‘the very 
formula [established by s 2] is not itself variable: it is a fixed rule of domestic law, 
enacted by Parliament.’81 Again, the logic of the Kelsonian form/substance 
distinction allows for this: the content of EU law could be varied in fact, whilst 
not being removed altogether as a matter of law.  
 
Fundamental Change 
The other significant point that arises from the rest of the UKSC’s judgment, and 
which must be defended if the critique of formalism is to be fully displaced, is the 
emphasis accorded to the notion that Article 50 TEU would bring about a major 
constitutional change. The UKSC relied extensively on the idea the ECA had an 
‘unprecedented effect’ in 1972.82 Thus notification under Article 50 TEU was said 
to be ‘far-reaching’,83 amounting to a ‘major change to UK constitutional 
arrangements which cannot be achieved by ministers alone’.84 Indeed, whenever 
it turned to deal with crucial submissions advanced by the Government, as a 
‘recurring theme’85 the UKSC would fall back on the assertion that such 
‘fundamental change’ could be effected in the only way that the UK constitution 
recognises, namely by Parliamentary legislation.86 This will be called the 
fundamental change argument. 
                                                             
80 Poole (n 13) 703. 
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83 ibid. 
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Elliott maintains several criticisms, most of which engage the justifiability 
facet of the formalism critique. First, the majority’s reasoning implies that from 
the empirical fact of constitutional change flowed significant legal consequences.87 
This first criticism leads into the next two. Second, if the use of the prerogative 
really is now constrained by its capacity to do things that have a degree of 
constitutional significance beyond a given threshold, it becomes necessary to 
identify precisely where that threshold is located. Yet, the majority provide little 
by the way of guidance to show that such a distinction is of ‘principled and 
predictable application’.88 To demonstrate the problems with a threshold 
requirement of fundamentality, Elliott moots the counter-factual of leaving the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’). Third, Elliott notes that it is 
not clear what more the argument of fundamentality adds. If the EU Treaties are 
domestic law, it must already be the case, therefore, that the prerogative cannot 
be used to remove such law, irrespective of whether removing this would effect a 
major constitutional change.89  
We will begin by addressing the second criticism, as it appears the most 
intuitive, before dealing with the first and third together. McCormick provides 
guidance as to the threshold requirement: Section 2(1) of the ECA inserted a ‘new 
criterion of recognition into an already functioning rule of recognition. Section 
2(4) indicates it ranking above other criteria.’90 Thus, in essence, the fundamental 
change argument had not so much to do with scale, as it had to do with kind. 
Section 2, in other words, created a criterion by which other domestic laws would 
be recognised as valid law. This is hinted at bythe UKSC when they state that the 
ECA created ‘a new constitutional process for making law in the United 
Kingdom.’91  
One can test the aforementioned by applying it to Elliott’s counter-factual 
of leaving the ECHR. The UKSC’s reasoning suggests that leaving the ECHR 
would be a fundamental change (in the Miller sense) and that the Government would 
therefore need Parliamentary consent in order to withdraw. It is possible to 
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acknowledge that the primary purpose of the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA’) 
was to enable the rights and remedies of the ECHR to be enforced by domestic 
courts92 while also maintaining that the HRA involves a ‘constitutional process 
for making law’ as a criterion of recognition. This is because common law rights 
cannot be asserted in the face of Parliamentary legislation, whereas Convention 
rights incorporated into domestic law by the operation of section 3 of the HRA 
can.93 In the event of conflict with legislation, statute must prevail over the 
common law, but not so under the HRA with its eventual appeal to Strasbourg. 
The HRA, therefore, could be seen as adding another ‘criterion of recognition’ 
for valid domestic law through its strong ‘interpretive obligation’ and avenue of 
appeal.94 
We can now turn to the first and third criticisms. These concern, first, the 
apparent non sequitur as the UKSC drew legal consequences from the fact of 
fundamental constitutional change and, second, the apparent failure of the 
fundamental change argument to add anything to the sources argument. Here, the 
Court showed its awareness as a constitutional player. The fundamental change 
argument shaped its response as a distinct constitutional agent, adding something 
more to the already established arguments and its reasoning processes, but not 
dictating the ultimate legal conclusion. Thus, the critique of formalism, not only 
as it pertained to justifiability and formal explanation, but also in so far as it 
engaged the practical engagement of the UKSC, again falls short. 
To illustrate this, one can begin by examining the manner in which the 
fundamental change argument is made.95 The UKSC began by considering the 
three categories of rights which could be removed by leaving the EU, reasoning 
that although many such rights could be replicated in a new statute, ‘the need for 
such replication would only arise because withdrawal from the EU Treaties would 
have abrogated domestic rights created by the 1972 Act (…) [and] the Court of 
Justice would no longer have any binding role in relation to them’.96 Having then 
laid out the Government’s submission that the loss of these rights had been 
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sanctioned by the 1972 Act,97 the Court proceeded to reject these submissions by 
repeating the fact that there would be a fundamental constitutional change four 
times.98 After the second, the UKSC emphasised that domestic rights would be 
open to repeal by domestic legislation since ‘they will no longer be paramount, 
but will be open to domestic repeal or amendment in ways that may be 
inconsistent with EU law.’99 
Two comments can be made on this reasoning. First, in contrast to the 
brief mentions of the fundamental change argument in the Divisional Court 
judgment,100 the manner in which the fundamental change argument was set out 
by the UKSC was different. For repeating the argument numerous times 
exemplifies a Court that was at worst worried, and at best anxious. The repetitive 
and failsafe nature of the argument can, hence, accurately be described as 
‘instinctual’.101  
But, and second, what was the UKSC worried about? A clue is found in 
the way in which it dealt with the argument that withdrawal from the EU would 
result in a loss of rights. As noted above, the Court held that EU withdrawal would 
create a ‘need’ for replication.102 But a need to have rights replaced is not a 
meaningful right itself: one does not have the right to the rights of a political 
community one is not a member of, whether these are currently enshrined in 
domestic law or not.103 Thus, at best, this argument can only be read as identifying 
a risk that rights would be lost due to withdrawal from the EU without replication 
and that such a risk is only a relevant risk in terms of rights protection if there is some 
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potential for it to materialise – ie some potential culprit. We speak in terms of rights 
protection because, in the view of this author, rights have no value without 
protection. 
Together, these two elements demonstrate a Court that is in some way 
worried or anxious about a risk to certain rights possessed by the claimants. This 
paper submits that the Court was worried about rights under the ECHR. 
Seemingly unnoticed by most in the academic debates surrounding Miller, the 
UKSC did not only emphasise the irrevocable nature of EU rights, but also 
touched upon the supervision of the ‘Court of Justice’104 and the lack of further 
references. It did so twice in one paragraph and twice again in another.105 This 
would thus seem to be the relevant risk in terms of rights protection that the UKSC 
was concerned with. 
But what value does the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) have in terms 
of the fundamental rights protection of people like Miller? The UKSC could not 
have been sure that leaving the EU and the concomitant loss of rights would 
actually result in a meaningful reduction in fundamental rights protection. Not 
only is the failure of the ECJ with regards to fundamental rights protection well-
documented (albeit still contentiously),106 no argument was brought as to whether 
or not leaving the EU would amount to a violation of the claimants’ rights under 
the HRA. Fundamentally, all would depend on the final content of the ‘Great 
Repeal Bill’.107  
Perhaps, then, the Court had in mind a different European court: the 
ECtHR. Perhaps the majority was trying to say that in relation to the abrogation 
of rights derived from an external European source, there was a risk that the 
ECHR would also be lost. Perhaps the UKSC was saying ‘this far, and no further’ 
– withdrawal from the ECHR as the irreducible minimum of fundamental rights 
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protection should not be effected without Parliamentary consent (if at all). Were 
this to happen in light of well-known repeat proposals by the Conservative Party 
to repeal the HRA, an applicant who considers their fundamental rights 
inadequately protected would be deprived of their invaluable final right of appeal 
(or ‘further references’) to the ECtHR as a body insulated from domestic political 
pressures in a manner the UKSC is not.  
To bring the point home, we can call upon the UKSC’s political awareness 
exemplified by the political argument in Hampden can be called upon. By the time 
the Miller case reached the UKSC, it was well-known that the Government was to 
negotiate the withdrawal of the UK from the EU in the two years provided for 
by Article 50 TEU – conditions ideal for the strength and speed of prerogative 
powers.108 In a political climate where all things European seem disdained, and in 
light of referendum majorities for a European exit and a Conservative 
Government previously dedicated to repealing the HRA,109 there was therefore a 
risk that a prerogative power of withdrawal would be used against the ECHR. 
Thus, based on both the premise of turbulent constitutional times and the relative 
competences of the constitutional bodies, the UKSC adapted its reasoning to 
argue that the Government could not be trusted with the power to effectuate 
fundamental constitutional change. This is not a non sequitur fallacy as Elliott would 
portray it; rather, this paper argues that it was the UKSC demonstrating its acute 
awareness of the politics of the era. While Parliament was too slow and inefficient 
in 1637, the prerogative powers might have seemed just too fast for the UKSC in 
2017. For the UKSC, then, it was easier to ‘trust Parliament’ than ‘trust the 
Government’.110  
Thus, heeding the UKSC’s warning, that there remained a risk that the 
prerogative powers may be used to implement more changes to the constitution 
than bargained for in the 2016 referendum if the terms of the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ 
were not drafted with precision111, Parliament responded by inserting in the Great 
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Repeal Bill the ostensibly ‘anomalous’112 provision that Government’s powers 
could not be used to repeal the HRA.113 Similarly, the Government responded by 
providing a section 19 statement, made by the David Davis, the ‘Brexit Minister’, 
on the front page of the Great Repeal Bill, which stated that the terms of the Bill 
were compliant with the UK’s obligations under the ECHR.114 Overall, therefore, 
we can see part of what lay at the heart of the fundamental change argument: a 
warning to the other constitutional players. This might have taken a little 
explaining, but it was nothing more than could be expected of any constitutional 
theorist who remained alive to the politics of the age, as the UKSC; here again, 
therefore, all elements of the formalism critique fell short. 
 
V. THE HEART OF THE BREXIT CASE 
 
So on what basis was Miller really decided? Left at this, the formalists could be 
right to say that the UKSC had other reasons – to those expressed in the judgment 
– for reaching its conclusions. Adverse consequences for the rule of law are a 
natural consequence thereof. I hold this to be false. At the heart of Miller, and in 
support of the suspicion of mistrust embodied by the political argument above, 
lies a basic, pragmatic fact. When faced with a fundamental change to the 
constitution, the sovereign body in the United Kingdom should always be given 
an effective opportunity to influence this change if it is to perform its proper 
constitutional function in (inter alia) promoting the good of the people. In short, 
the Supreme Court in Miller decided that if Parliament was to have any choice in 
the Brexit negotiations at all, it had to be a choice it had reason to value, namely 
one at the start of the two-year negotiations.  
To understand the final defence of the majority’s position, furthermore, 
we must first understand its critical weakness. The argument for the majority rests 
on the footing that EU law had become an independent, overriding source of 
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domestic law. That so, it would seem to inevitably follow that there was no 
question about the use of the prerogative.  
However, the majority’s ultimate conclusion only follows if the act of 
giving notification is itself an act removing domestic law. This was how the 
majority characterised it115 and what allowed them to characterise a need for rights 
as a relevant legal consideration. Yet, as demonstrated by both Lord Hughes in 
the minority and by Feldman, the opposite could equally be argued: the 
notification did not fire a bullet, it merely signified ‘the start of an essentially 
political process of negotiation and decision-making within the framework of that 
article’ which depending on the terms of the final primary legislation might lead to 
rights being lost.116 It is difficult to say which characterisation is right as the 
notification does not itself change domestic law but, at the same time, removing 
the Treaty would render it nugatory.  
The dispute is really a semantic one, dependent on how one characterises 
EU law itself in the first place. If EU law is a source of domestic law, withdrawal 
from the Treaties is itself an act of changing/removing domestic law (per the 
majority). Although, as demonstrated above, this was the more realistic 
characterisation, this, in and of itself, is arguably insufficient justification to 
demonstrate why EU law should be characterised as such.117 If, however, EU law 
is characterised as having effect in the UK by the ECA (per the minority), then 
notification is only the start of a two-year-long political process.118 To this extent, 
all the characterisations of the Article 50 TEU trigger are somewhat misleading at 
a superficial level.  
I say misleading at a superficial level because the analogy of a bullet being 
fired draws attention to a deeper, final aspect of the majority’s reasoning: the 
question concerning which constitutional player was better placed, in terms of its 
constitutional capacity, to take responsibility for enacting the referendum result so 
as to minimise the risk that the will of the people would be frustrated. In doing 
so, the UKSC chose to characterise EU law in the way it did in order to distribute 
the responsibility of notification between the relevant constitutional players. It is 
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here where the justifiability or alternative facet of the formalistic critique could really 
bite: did the UKSC make the right choice? 
 
VI. MILLER, HAMPDEN, AND THE VALUE OF CHOICE 
 
The reasoning in defence of Miller runs as follows. The starting assumption is that 
withdrawing from the EU does present a fundamental constitutional change in that 
it sought to change a constitutional ‘criterion of recognition’, either by way of legal 
effect through the ECA or by EU law as a ‘direct and independent’ source of 
domestic law. This proposition was defended above. Next, we draw on the lessons 
learnt from Hampden.  
The starting point is to recognise, as the Court of Exchequer did in 
Hampden, that the sovereign – both Parliament and the Government – is under a 
duty to promote the common good of man.119 Where there is a duty, there must 
be a right to enforce or undertake that duty.120 The majority in Miller seemed to 
consider this duty at risk of breach and alluded to a disconnect between, on the 
one hand, the result of the referendum and, on the other, the exercise of power 
under Article 50 TEU. Ministers could have triggered Article 50 TEU ‘even if 
there had been no referendum or indeed, at least in theory, even if any referendum 
had resulted in a vote to remain.’121 Thus, the sovereign, either Parliament or the 
Government, should have a right to enforce the referendum result and protect 
against the possibility that the will of the people would be frustrated. 
This in itself does not distinguish between Parliament and the 
Government, for these concerns are arguably equally applicable to both. Arguably 
Parliament could also take a different path from that recommended by the 
referendum by, say, refusing to give the Government the authorisation required 
to trigger Article 50 TEU. The latter is the absurdity of the Miller case, which 
stokes in part the formalism critique: whichever body was to make the decision, 
surely it would not have mattered? As noted already, by the time Miller came before 
the UKSC, the Court was aware that both the Government and Parliament had 
                                                             
119 To reject this possibility, is to reject the legitimacy of democratic political authority per 
se and is, therefore, in the main sense of the term ‘unreasonable’ ignoring that we all 
wish to pursue our own basic goods in a range of reasonable ways. On this, see Jonathan 
Crowe, ‘Natural Law Beyond Finnis’ (2011) 2 Jurisprudence 293. 
120 Lex non cogit ad impossibilia as it was put in the context of Hampden (n 46). 
121 Miller (n 1) [91]. 
 
2018 LSE LAW REVIEW 109 
 
 
agreed to implement the referendum result.122 Surely neither the Government nor 
Parliament would risk the wrath of the people? But, such a risk is always implicit 
in the very fact of a national referendum, merely ‘advisory’, ‘legally binding’, or 
otherwise, together with the derived constituent authority123 of the sovereign.124 
One must decide, therefore, which body is better placed to protect against such a 
risk, were it to materialise.  
As we have learnt from Hampden, one can begin by focusing on and 
evaluating the relative constitutional strengths and weaknesses of both bodies. 
Ultimately, these conditions, coupled with the risk of a frustrated referendum 
result, were part and parcel of the ‘background conditions’ in Miller against which 
the value the relevant constitutional actors would attach to their ability to choose in 
such circumstances must be evaluated.125  
It is submitted that the only meaningful difference between Parliament 
and the Government can be found in the speeds with which the relevant bodies 
can act.126 The minority were quick to point out that the Government’s 
constitutional legitimacy arises from the basic constitutional need for ‘unanimity, 
strength and dispatch’ because sometimes, to unite the wills of many and reduce 
them to one, ‘is a work of more time and delay than the exigencies of state will 
afford.’127 Yet, the minority did not take this to its logical conclusion: if the only 
relevant risk is that the will of the people could be frustrated, the slower this 
occurred, the better. 
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If Parliament, by contrast, were to demonstrate such an intent to frustrate 
the referendum result, given the time for legislation to pass through two heavily 
accommodated Houses of Parliament, the safeguards are much greater. A 
legislative act contrary to the expressed will of the people in a national referendum 
would be inherently difficult to pass – much less so than a simple letter written by 
the Prime Minister. Furthermore, the possibility that Parliament would legislate 
contrary to the outcome of the referendum would always be slim as it would have 
to balance the potential for revolt with what it considers the true fulfilment of 
their duty to promote the common good of the people.  
Interests on all sides are therefore better protected if Parliament, not the 
Government, is given the power of notification under Article 50 TEU. As it was 
put in Hampden, the sovereign should not have to wait until the ‘very moment the 
storm has burst on the realm’ and its safety has been ‘irreparably destroyed’, 
before being able to act.128 If the Government were to demonstrate an intent to 
frustrate the will of the people, Parliament should not have to stand by and wait. 
The ability to pre-empt the Government was a choice Parliament, and the people, 
had reason to value having. 
In these respects, the speed with which Government could act conferred 
on it a great advantage over Parliament and, therefore, represented a significant 
risk to Parliament enforcing its duty to the people. This helps to explain what this 
author submits to be the central tenets of the majority’s reasoning. Having alluded 
to the possibility of a disconnect between Parliamentary intention and the 
Government’s actions,129 the majority saw  
 
(…) a substantial difference between (i) ministers having a 
freely exercisable power to do something whose exercise 
may have to be subsequently explained to Parliament and 
(ii) ministers having no power to do that thing unless it is 
first accorded to them by Parliament.130  
 
Thus, ‘if ministers give notice without Parliament having first authorised 
them to do so, the die will be cast before Parliament has become formally 
                                                             
128 Keir (n 29) 557. 
129 Miller (n 1) [91]. 
130 ibid [92]. 
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involved.’131 Given the speed with which the Government could implement such 
an action, this paper suggests that Parliament would be unable to fulfil its 
constitutional duty. So, as the majority themselves put it, there was a ‘good 
pragmatic argument’ for their final conclusion.132 
The minority in Miller emphasised what some have considered the more 
laissez faire spirit that the prerogative powers would always be scrutinised by 
Parliamentary accountability mechanisms.133 This would be a mistake. 
Hypothetically, if the Government sought to frustrate the referendum result, even 
with Parliamentary accountability mechanisms, Parliament – and, one might add, 
the people – would be left to pick up the pieces ex post facto. They would be forced 
to litigate, within the two year period, the hitherto undecided questions of: (1) 
whether the prerogative power in this context would be open to judicial review;134 
and (2) whether Article 50 TEU is revocable.  
With regards to the latter, Parliament really would have no opportunity to 
govern as of right: whether Article 50 TEU is revocable is largely dependent on 
the willingness of other EU member states.135 Intervention after the fact of an 
Article 50 notification was therefore not an opportunity Parliament had at all, let 
alone one it had reason to value. If Parliament were to comply with their duty to 
do the good of the people, and therefore maintain their reason to exist as a body 
of political authority at all, they had to do so at the start of the two-year process. 
If these arguments seem ad hoc, this is a feature, rather than a criticism, of the 
United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangement. In this sense, the majority were 
correct to recognise, by quoting with approval at the start of their judgment, 
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132 Referring to the work and time required to pass legislation, albeit in the two year 
negotiations period [100] and cf [92]: ‘The major practical difference between the two 
categories, in a case such as this where the exercise of the power is irrevocable, is that 
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Dicey’s assertion that the UK constitution is ‘the most flexible polity in 
existence’.136  
The minority made the same mistake as they did in Hampden, namely, 
maintaining a mutually destructive position: seeking to assert that Parliament was 
both at once under a constitutional duty to guarantee the common good of the 
people, but should have no choice in the matter, at least not until the Government 
acted, so that the danger was ‘immediate’ and it would have been too late. 
Moreover, while Lord Carnwath in the minority considered that ‘legal formalism’ 
was evident in that the majority’s decision would ‘do nothing to resolve the many 
practical issues’ arising from the two year period,137 neither would finding for the 
Government. Instead, the majority’s reasoning provides real practical protection 
for Parliament from future unwanted fundamental changes to the constitution. 
So much for legal formalism. These considerations, I submit, all but obliterate the 
critique of formalism: it is a ship without sails. 
Only the majority in the UKSC in Miller, therefore, created circumstances 
in which Parliament could effectively exercise its agency as a constitutional player. 
More so, it did so on terms the people could not reasonably reject. The minority, 
on the other hand, kept to the strict letter of dualist tradition. Doing so, ironically, 
amounted to an unjustified adherence to legal theory failing, amongst others, to 
recognise that the role of dualist theory is to protect Parliament.138 If the 
Government were given the power of notification, Parliament would have been 
provided with no protection from its swift manoeuvres: all facets of the formalism 
critique, ie the needs for formal explanation, justification, and a connection with 
reality, therefore fail.139  
 
 
                                                             
136 Miller (n 1) [40] citing Albert V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 
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139 Though let us not forget another valuable lesson to be learnt from Hampden (n 2) 1217 
(Sir John Finch): ‘in the debating of this case, there hath been great variety of opinions 
among the judges, [which] shews commonly the difficulty of the thing, and argueth a 
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be most odious. All that hath gone before me, have one thing agreed, that it is the 
greatest case that ever came in any of our memories, or the memory of any man’.  
 
2018 LSE LAW REVIEW 113 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Shortly after the 1972 Act came into force, Lord Denning MR famously spoke of 
the European Treaty as ‘like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up 
the rivers. It cannot be held back (…)’.140 It would seem appropriate then that just 
as the UK courts’ awkward relationship with the EU set sail with a case on the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1988,141 so it should finish with reflections upon a case 
concerning ship-money. This note has sought to elucidate upon and defend the 
majority’s reasoning in Miller so it may escape the critique of formalism. In doing 
so, the article relied on the past, ie Hampden, for guidance and sought to venture 
forward to contribute to current debates on the immediate future of Britain, 
particularly in relation to the ECHR. 
In closing his work on Hampden, Kier notes that the reasons for the Court 
of Exchequer Chamber siding with the King could  
 
(…) be the force of the arguments which placed the safety 
of the realm in the hands of an individual assumed to be 
well-informed and disinterested, rather than an assembly 
[such as Parliament] inexperienced, selfish, and short-
sighted. A very different [Parliament] from that dissolved 
in 1629 had to develop before the royal prerogative could 
safely pass under its control.142  
 
A few hundred years later and Parliament is indeed a very different body. 
Parliament, for all its continued shortcomings and criticisms, could be trusted with 
the valuable choice under Article 50 TEU. The courts gave Parliament that choice 
by means of Miller. Far from being enemies of the people, therefore, the UKSC 
has again proved itself, as its forebear did in 1637, to be quite the opposite. 
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